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better way of clarifying the law of the commercial world than by
using terminology in the law that is common to commerce and the
business world. In the event of adoption of the code, however, the
understanding of it would be well served by including the comments
of the drafters because, as above noted, the code itself is much clari-
fied and explained by these comments.
HAROLD M. FRAUENDORFER
Marquette L.L.B., 1953
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AIRSPACE
The development of wide-spread air navigation has presented an
interesting problem to the legal world. Just who owns and controls the
airspace over this nation? Is it the subjacent landowner? If not, is it
then the property of the public? If'the property of the public, which
government, federal, state or local is supreme as to regulating the use
of this airspace?
Prior to the advent of aeronautics, the courts had relied on the
ancient maxim, "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad in-
fernas," in determining the landowner's rights to the airspace above
his property.' Freely translated the maxim reads: "He who possesses
the land possesses also all that which is above and below." Now that
air travel is on a nationwide scale, four theories of airspace owner-
ship have been advanced: (1) The ancient "ad coelum" maxim men-
tioned above which gives the landowner unrestricted ownership; (2)
There is no ownership at all of unenclosed airspace. This theory is the
extreme opposite of the first theory; (3) Landowner has unrestricted
ownership, but the airspace is subject to a "privilege" of aerial transit
at reasonable altitudes. This theory offers a compromise between the
extremes of the first two theories; (4)-There is unrestricted owner-
ship up to a certain altitude, at which ownership ceases. This is the so-
called "zone theory." The extent of the zone is designated by such
phrases as "lower stratum," "effective possession," or "actual or pros-
pective user."2
It is obvious that to apply the ad coelum maxim to the operation
of airplanes would be a serious barrier to the development of avia-
tion. Each flight would be a trespass against the rights of the land-
'Bury v. Pope, 1 Cro. Elizabeth 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1586) was the first
reported case in which the maxim was quoted. Case held that where a
landowner erects a house so close to a window on the adjoining property
that the light is ct off therefrom, the injured landowner has no complaint
even though his building and his window were built forty years before the
second building was erected. Penruddock's case, 5 Coke's Rep. 100 (1597)
Baten's case, 9 Coke's Rep. 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 810 (1611).
2 Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Lando'wner and Aviator in
Anglo-Am erican Law, 3 J. AIR L. 329 (1932).
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.owner. Even though the landowner might only. recover nominal, dam-
ages in a suit, the flight itself would be unlawful. The courts have
recognized that the ancient maxim is not applicable to aeronautics
and have rejected its modern application.3 The leading case of United
States v. Causby expresses it thus:
"The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were
that not true every transcontinental flight would subject the
operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at
the idea. To recognize such private claim to the airspace would
clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and
development in the public interest, and transfer into private
ownership that to which only the public has a just claim." 4
Since the courts have refused to recognize the landowner's abso-
lute ownership, the problem arises as to who may control activities
in the airspace. Twenty-two states, claiming to possess sovereignty
over the airspace where not granted to and assumed by the Federal
government, have adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act., Section 3
therefore provides:
"The ownership of the space above the lands and waters of
this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the
surface beneath subject to the right of flight described in Sec-
tion 4."6
Wisconsin has enacted this into law.7 Also the Restatement of Torts
provides, in effect, that an entry above the surface of the earth is
"privileged" if flight is conducted at such height as not to interfere
unreasonably with the possessor's enjoyment of the surface and the
airspace above it." These approaches to the problem appear to resemble
theory (3) outlined above.
The leading case involving the state jurisdiction over airspace is
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.,9 which held that flights over
property at altitudes of 100 feet constituted trespass; but the court re-
fused to decide whether flights above 100 feet and under 500 feet con-
stituted trespass or not. For purposes of the decision the court as-
sumed that private ownership of airspace extends to all reasonable
3 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Swetland v. Curtis Airports
Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1931) ; Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. 2d
755 (9th Cir. 1936) ; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245
(1942); Lashbrook, The "Ad Coelum" Maxim as Applied to Aviation Law,
21 NoTra DAME LAW 143 (1946); Note, 23 MAR. L. REv. 131 (1939).
4 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946), reversing 60 F.Supp. 7511 (1945).
5 Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Wisconsin. 11 U.L.A. 157 (1938).
6UNIFORM AERONAUTIcS AcT, Sec. 3, 11 U.L.A. (1938).7 Wis. STATS. 114.03 (1951).8 REsTATEMENT, ToRTs, §194 (1934).
9270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
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heights above the underlying land. The case does not expressly affirm
the ad coelum doctrine, even though it recognizes the existence of an
aerial trespass. The Chancery Court of Delaware found, in a situa-
tion similar to Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., that low-flying
planes constituted a nuisance because the flight was "so low as to inter-
fere with the then existing use to which the land is put." 10
Smith v. New England Aircraft also upheld the state's police power
as controlling in the airspace. The court said:
"The statutes of this Commonwealth regulating the operation
of aircraft manifestly were enacted under the police power...
It (police power) includes the right to legislate in the interest
of the public health, the public safety and the public morals...
It is the proper function of the legislative department of the
government in the exercise of police power to consider the prob-
lems and risks that arise from the use of new invention and en-
deavor to adjust private rights and harmonize conflicting inter-
ests by comprehensive statutes for the public welfare."' "-
The "no ownership" theory described in (2) above has been
adopted in one leading case, Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport.1 2 The
premise of this theory is that the basis of all ownership is possession,
hence the landowner "owns" only that airspace of which he actually
makes use. The Court of Appeals said:
"We own so much of the space above the ground as we can
occupy or make use of, in connection with the enjoyment of our
land. This right is not fixed. It varies with our varying needs
and is co-extensive with them. The owner of the land owns
as much of the space above him as he uses, but only so long
as he uses it. All that lies beyond belongs to the world."'13
Flights as low as five feet were found not to be trespasses unless they
interfered with the landowner's use of the land.' 4 Advocates of this
theory claim that it protects the landowner's rights which might need
protection, yet prevents unreasonable landowners from using "technical
trespass" to harass the aviation industry. 15
The trend of modem authority appears to be toward the "Possible
Effective Possession Zone" theory.' 6 This is one of the types men-
tioned in theory (4) above. It gives the landowner exclusive right to
the airspace above the surface which is necessary to the reasonable
use and enjoyment of the surface. The "zone" need not be reduced
1026 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A. 2d 87 (1942).
21 Supra, note 9 at 390.
1284 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
13 Ibid., p.7 5 8 .
1 4Supra, note 12.
is Comment, 2 ARK. L. Rzv. 448 (1948).
16 Eubank, The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, 12 BosroN
U. L. REv. 414 (1932).
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to possession or put to actual use by the landowner. If it is within
the zone of possible effective possession or expected use, it is suffi-
cient.1 7 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. s was the first leading case
approving this doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit
stated:
"He (the landowner) has a dominant right of occupancy for
purposes incident to his use and enjoyment of the surface....
We can not fix a definite and unvarying height below which
the surface owner may reasonably expect to occupy the air-
space for himself. That height is to be determined upon the
particular facts in each case."1 9
The zone theory may be criticized for uncertainty because in each
case the court must define the "effective possession zone," depending
upon the facts.20
The only United States Supreme Court decision on the conflict
between landowner and aviator is the leading case, United States v.
Causby,21 construing the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938. The Court divides the airspace over the
United States into two zones. The upper zone is called navigable air-
space. Congress has defined it, "as airspace above minimum safe alti-
tudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority...,,22
In this upper zone the rights of the federal government are so com-
plete that this navigable airspace, according to the Court's opinion, is
"within the public domain. ' 23 Facts of the Causby case were:
Causby owned a small chicken farm one-third of a mile from an
airfield which had been leased to the United States Government as an
Army and Navy air base. The "glide pattern" was directly over the
Causby property. Claiming that frequent low flights by high powered
planes had destroyed the use of the property as a commercial chicken
farm, the Causbys brought suit against the government in the Court
of Claims on the theory that there had been a compensable "taking"
of property within the Fifth Amendment. The Court found that the
flights, noise, and lights had destroyed the use as alleged, deprived
the family of their sleep and made them nervous and frightened. It
was held that the Government had taken an easement over the land
and that the value of the easement (and the chickens destroyed) was
$2,000. The Supreme Court found that there was a "taking" and that
the Causbys were entitled to compensation.
17.Supra, note 15.
1S41 F. 2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), Modified by 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
19 55 F. 2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1931).
2 Supra, note 15.
2 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
2249 U.S.C.A. §180 (1951).
23Supra, note 21 at 266.
19531
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Before the Causby case, the only known remedies for the landowner
whose airspace had been invaded were trespass, nuisance or negli-
gence. Commentators point out that the Causby case expands the
-remedies available to the landowner.2 4 However, since the enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, this aspect is unimportant.2 The
question still remains whether the landowner should be entitled to re-
lief on trespass or nuisance. If a court adopts the trespass theory, it,
in effect, holds that there can be ownership of navigable airspace by
the subjacent proprietor, and the remaining questions seek to de-
termine the extent of that ownership and whether there has been an
invasion of it. If the nuisance theory is adopted, an injunction will
be granted only in cases where there is proof that the low flights un-
reasonably and substantially interfere with the landowner's use of the
surface.
The problem of which government, state, local or federal, should
be recognized as supreme in the regulation of aeronautics has been
the subject of considerable litigation and legal literature.2 6 Since .the
development of nation-wide air transportation, the trend has been
toward ever increasing control by the federal government.27 Some
claim that the sovereignity of the federal government is now supreme
in regard to navigable airspace.28 The Air Commerce Act of 192629
and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193830 expressly claim this sover-
iegnty for the federal government. Twenty-two states have adopted
the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, which recognizes that sover-
iegnty may have been granted to the federal government, and does
not purport to regulate air flights in respects covered by federal legis-
lation.A'
The argument for federal supremacy is based not only upon the
treaty 2 war making 3 and interstate commerce34 clauses of the Con-
24Note, 41 ILL. L. REv. 502 (1946); Comment, supra, note 15.
2528 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) (1951).
26 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300
(1931); Erickson v. King, State Auditor et al., 218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W. 2d 201
(1944) ; Dinu, State Sovereignty in Navigable Airspace, 17 J. AIR L. 43 (1950) ;
Cooper, State Sovereignty v. Federal Sovereignty of Naviqable Airspace,
15 J. AIR L. 27 (1948); Brown, Aircraft and the Law, 255 (1933); Zollman,
Law of the Air, Chapter 2 (1927) ; 6 AM. JUR. Aviation §§12 and 13; C.J.S.
Aerial Navigation §3; Notes, 69 A.L.R. 322 (1930), 83 A.L.R. 336 (1933),
99 A.L.R. 177 (1935).
27 Fixel, Law of Aviation, §59 (3rd ed. 1948) ; Plaine, State Aviation Legislation,
14 J. AIR L. 333 (1947).
28 Bouve, The Development of International Rules of Conduct in Air Navigation,
1 AIR L. REv. 1 (1930) ; Cooper, State Sovereignty v. Federal Sovereignty of
Navigable Airspace, 15 3. AIR L. 27 (1948).
2944 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C.A. §176 (1951).
3052 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §403 (1951).
3 11 U.L.A. Motor Vehicles and Aeronautics, §157 (1938).
3 U.S. Const. Art. III, §2.
3 U.S. Const. Art. I, §8.
34 Ibid.
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stitution, but also upon the alleged "proprietory interest" of the fed-
eral government-in navigable airspace.35
A supreme Court decision cited by the proponents of federal sover-
eignty is United States v. California.3" The opinion in that case in-
dicates that the Court felt that the paramount rights in the three-mile
ocean belt along the coast of California had been acquired directly
by the federal government since the adoption of the United States
Constitution. One author comments on the Causby and California
cases:
"Either the several States may be held under these rulings to
be entirely without sovereignty or right of control in the nav-
igable airspace over their- surface territories, or the power and
rights of the Federal government may be found so paramount
in the navigable airspace as to produce the same legal results.."I T
As regards interstate commerce, postal service and matters of
national defense, jurisdiction of 'passage through the air in large part
was expressly or implicitly surrendered by the states to the United
States by the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Insofar as these
regulations made by the Federal government promote safety and effic-
iency in interstate, overseas or foreign commerce and bear some rea-
sonable relationship to the subject, they are supreme and may not be
denied."8
The power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce
is held to be exclusive by a long line of decisions and cannot be inter-
fered with by state laws, except so far as they constitute a legitimate
exercise of the police power; and even police regulations must yield
when they come into conflict with the national power over commerce.3 9
The courts have interpreted the provisions of the Air Commerce
Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 to indicate that
Congress intended, as one of the main purposes of the above Acts,
the promotion of air safety. Rosenhan v. United States describes it:
'This chapter (Title 49, United States Code) was enacted as
advanced legislation in recognition of rapidly growing air com-
merce and was comprehensively designed to promote civil aero-
nautics and to that end develop and secure maximum aeronauti-
cal safety." 40
The state does have exclusive power to prescribe rules to govern
5 Mr. Clement Bouv6 quoted by Cooper, State Sovereignty v. Federal Sover-
eignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J. AiR L. 27 (1948).36332 U.S. 19 (1947).
3 Cooper, State Sovereignty v. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace,
15 J. AIR L. 27 (1948).3 8 Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F. 2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. den. 318 U.S.
79 (1943) ; Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51' S.E. 2d 610 (1949).
39 People v. Katz, 249 N.Y. Supp. 719 (1931).40 Suprai note 38 at 934.
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the operation of aircraft flying in purely intra-state flights." State
statutes regulating such flights, so far as may be necessary to the wel-
fare and safety of those on land, are a rightful exercise of the state's
police power.4 2 However, this jurisdiction is restricted by the fed-
eral government's control over interstate commerce.
Whenever the state or local laws regulating flying conflict with
federal laws on the subject, the state or local laws must give way if
they are found to be a burden on interstate commerce. 43 If the state
or local regulation does not burden interstate commerce, it will be
upheld. If Congress has not legislated on the matter, the state or local
regulations are valid if they are not burdensome. 44 Courts upholding
the validity of state regulations recognize that if the regulations had
in any manner interfered with interstate commerce, the validity of
the regulations would disappear. 45
Wisconsin has adopted the Uniform State Law on Aeronautics. 48
Therefore she claims sovereignty in the airspace above this state ex-
cept where granted to and assumed by the Federal government. The
Wisconsin statutes also recognize the necessity of cooperation with
federal aeronautical authorities.4 7 In problems concerning flight alti-
tudes, the Wisconsin courts appear to have adopted the regulations of
the Civil Aeronautics Authority.4 s
A recent case, All American Airways et al. v. Village of Cedar-
hurst et al.,49 focuses attention on the practical difficulties that arise
when considering which government regulations are to prevail. The
Village of Cedarhurst is situated very close to the busy New York
International Airport (Idlewild). Alarmed by a series of accidents
in which aircraft had crashed into populated areas adjacent to air-
ports in nearby communities, the village enacted an ordinance based
on its police power, prohibiting aircraft from flying over the village
at altitudes of less than 1,000 feet. The approach to one of the air-
port's major runways is directly over the village. The regulation of
the Federal Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board requires a descent to 518 feet at the edge of the village.
Enforcement of the village odrinance would seriously impair the op-
erations of the airport. Ten airlines, airplane pilots, the operators of the
airport, and the administrator and the CAB as intervenors, petitioned
41Parker v. James Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P. 2d 226 (1935), app. dism.
298 U.S. 644 (1936).
4-Supra, note 9.
43 United States v. Perko, 108 F.Supp. 315 (D.C. Minn. 1952) ; Brown, Aircraft
and the law, 261 (1933).
44 6 Am. JuR. Aviation §13; Note 99 A.L.R. 173 (1938).
45 Supra, notes 39 and 41.
4GWIs. STATS. Ch. 114 (1951).
"WIs. STATS. §114.31 (4) 1951.
"Kuntz N. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405. 43 N.W. 2d 476 (1950).
4.106 F.Supp. 521 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1952), aff'd 201 F.2d 273 (2nd Cir. 1953).
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for a declaratory judgement and for an injunction restraining the vil-
lage and its officials from enforcing the ordinance. The District Court
found the ordinance conflicted with Congressional legislation and that
the enforcement of the ordinance threatened plaintiffs with irreparable
injury. An injunction pendente life was granted. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant village con-
tended that there was no substantial doubt ag to the validity of the
ordinance and that the federal court lacked jurisdiction until the
plaintiffs had exhausted their state remedies. Individual property
owners of the village entered the suit after the lower court granted
the injunction and sought an injunction themselves against the plain-
tiffs, on the ground that flying at such low altitudes constituted either
trespass or a nuisance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction
pendente lite, stating that there was sufficient question of validity of
the ordinance as against the supremacy of national power to continue
the injunction pending trial and possible establishment by property
owners of their claims of trespass and nuisance. Judge Clark, writing
the opinion, recognized "The importance of the interests involved and
potentially far-reaching effects" of the case. The dispute between fed-
eral regulation and the village ordinance, he asserted, "is clearly a
very real one not easily to be settled." 50
It appears that the landowner's rights are now very definitely lim-
ited. He must show, in any particular fact situation, that there exists
either trespass, nuisance or a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment.
United States v. Willow River Paper Co.,51 involving water rights,
casts some doubt as to the validity of the "taking" theory. The court
stated:
"Operations of the Government in aid of navigation oft times
inflict serious damage or inconvenience or interfere with advan-
tages formerly enjoyed by riparian owners, but damage alone
gives courts no power to require compensation where there is
not an actual taking of property. . The uncompensated dam-
ages sustained by this riparian owner on a public highway are
not different from those often suffered without indemnification
by owners abutting on public highways by land."52
Apparently the subjacent landowner's control of airspace is defi-
nitely limited so as not to interfere with the right of flight. Correspond-
ing to this limitation is the surrender of the control over the airspace
by state or local authorities to the federal government. Local or state
regulations of airplane flights will not be upheld if the regulations con-
flict in any manner with federal regulations. The ordinance involved
30201 F2d 273, 275 (2nd Cir. 1953).
51324 U.S. 499 (1945).
52 Ibid., at 510.
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in the Cedarhurst case certainly appears to be of doubtful constitutional
validity since it conflicts directly with federal regulations over the
same subject matter.
J. JOSEPH CUMMINGS
Marquette L.LB., 1953
